Reappearance of misc in the fifth blue hat cup preliminary competition

It's a pity that the day of the competition is the day when I have the most things this month. I have less than 30 minutes to do the question. The picture question almost came out

In the final analysis, I'm too delicious. I'll work hard next time

I packed a copy of the title attachment:

Link: https://pan.baidu.com/s/1txp06OAZL9Ce-qN_VQhLtg
Extraction code: v9j7

Winter Olympics_ is_coming

The previous operation is the basic operation. binwalk separates a compressed package and finds a prompt at the comment information

First look at the spectrum and waveform of the obtained mp3 file with Audacity. If there is no abnormality, it should be mp3 steganography. The eight numbers prompted here should be the hint of password. The theme of the Winter Olympic Games + 8 digits. It is easy to think of the date of the Winter Olympic Games: 20204

Using MP3Stego, the command is as follows, and the decryption is successful

Decoded text encode mp3. Txt is as follows. If you observe carefully, you will find that there are some spaces in the middle for segmentation

So write a script to remove \ x, and then convert the hexadecimal to characters to get

It was stuck here at that time. Unfortunately, I didn't recognize the character at that time. After the game, I found that I had done this test site before... It was wingdings, bugku's misc title, drunkenness and carnival. That's the character I got. Go Online website decrypt

It should have been separated by spaces. The spaces were ignored in the previous decoding process, but a little attention can be found. Let's go to github to find a project named 1cePeak. Project address: https://github.com/Tr0jAnV1rU4/1cePeak/blob/main/A/post-checkout

Click here to download the file
Open with notepad and find the following contents

#!/bin/sh
echo How_6ad_c0uld_a_1cePeak_be? >&2

How_6ad_c0uld_a_1cePeak_be? I don't know what's the use for the moment. I turn around and look at the pictures and mp3 files. I find a cipher at the end of the mp3 file

So copy the hexadecimal value of the following content, take it to convert characters, and solve a pile of emoji

So use emoji-aes Decryption. The key here is the character just solved. The flag is successfully solved

I_will_but_not_quite

Gave an encrypted py script and twin Vmem, it is obvious that we need memory forensics, get the key information, and then come back to write the decryption script.

First analyze the image: Python vol.py - f twin vmem imageinfo

Know that the system version is Win7SP1x64

Then analyze the process: Python vol.py - f twin vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist

Offset(V)          Name                    PID   PPID   Thds     Hnds   Sess  Wow64 Start                          Exit                          
------------------ -------------------- ------ ------ ------ -------- ------ ------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------
0xfffffa8000cbfb30 System                    4      0     84      515 ------      0 2021-03-29 09:44:08 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80012734f0 smss.exe                256      4      2       29 ------      0 2021-03-29 09:44:08 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001e1c3d0 csrss.exe               332    324      9      416      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:15 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80019e5b30 csrss.exe               384    376     11      310      1      0 2021-03-29 09:44:16 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001ef3920 wininit.exe             392    324      3       77      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:16 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001ebe910 winlogon.exe            424    376      3      113      1      0 2021-03-29 09:44:16 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001efeb30 services.exe            488    392      7      194      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:17 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001f35330 lsass.exe               496    392      7      592      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:18 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001f42b30 lsm.exe                 508    392     10      141      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:18 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80022bf6f0 svchost.exe             600    488     11      347      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:23 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80022ddb30 svchost.exe             672    488      8      275      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:24 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa800231a700 svchost.exe             764    488     20      459      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:24 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002328210 svchost.exe             800    488     16      368      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:25 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002357660 svchost.exe             824    488     33      948      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:25 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa800237fb30 svchost.exe             992    488     10      520      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:26 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80023da390 svchost.exe             344    488     15      483      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:27 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80024197d0 spoolsv.exe            1032    488     12      315      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:29 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa800242cb30 svchost.exe            1072    488     19      307      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:29 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa800228ab30 vmtoolsd.exe           1244    488      9      281      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:31 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002601b30 taskhost.exe           1508    488      9      206      1      0 2021-03-29 09:44:35 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002610b30 dwm.exe                1724    800      3       68      1      0 2021-03-29 09:44:36 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa800101bb30 TPAutoConnSvc.         1760    488     10      140      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:36 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002674b30 explorer.exe           1792   1636     44      879      1      0 2021-03-29 09:44:37 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80025c5b30 dllhost.exe            2024    488     13      186      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:38 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002526b30 TPAutoConnect.         1356   1760      5      118      1      0 2021-03-29 09:44:39 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002713060 conhost.exe            1428    384      1       32      1      0 2021-03-29 09:44:39 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002537b30 msdtc.exe              1744    488     12      144      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:40 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002840b30 vmtoolsd.exe           2160   1792      7      297      1      0 2021-03-29 09:44:45 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80028a6b30 SearchIndexer.         2416    488     11      656      0      0 2021-03-29 09:44:53 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80028c1b30 jusched.exe            2496   2200      6      377      1      1 2021-03-29 09:44:55 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80029d6680 svchost.exe            2748    488      7      110      0      0 2021-03-29 09:45:05 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80023ef990 svchost.exe             860    488     13      333      0      0 2021-03-29 09:46:36 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa80019dfb30 WmiPrvSE.exe           1440    600      7      109      0      0 2021-03-29 09:48:34 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8002749b30 jucheck.exe            2960   2496      7      368      1      1 2021-03-29 09:50:24 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001e38b30 javaws.exe              400   2960      0 --------      1      0 2021-03-29 09:50:24 UTC+0000   2021-03-29 09:50:24 UTC+0000  
0xfffffa8001d0d200 jp2launcher.ex         1932    400     27      439      1      0 2021-03-29 09:50:24 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001fc9060 taskeng.exe            3044    824      4       83      1      0 2021-03-30 07:52:37 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa800282eb30 SearchProtocol         2020   2416      8      321      0      0 2021-03-30 07:55:59 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001fb22b0 SearchFilterHo         3024   2416      5       98      0      0 2021-03-30 07:55:59 UTC+0000                                 
0xfffffa8001fbb990 WinRAR.exe             1696   1792     18      564      1      0 2021-03-30 07:56:21 UTC+0000

Found WinRAR Exe is a little suspicious. It may have been compressed or decompressed. Use filescan with grep command to check rar and zip files

dump these two

python vol.py -f Twin.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x000000003ed15070 --dump-dir=./
python vol.py -f Twin.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -Q 0x000000003e557990 --dump-dir=./

Get these two files, pull win10 back from kali, change the suffix, and then analyze

inverted reflection in water. After opening zip, change the suffix inside to jpg and drag it into winhex. After analysis, it is found that there is a string of base64 at the end

After decoding, look at the last few numbers, combine the reflection of the file name, turn the data upside down and save it as a 1 zip

There's a flag in it Txt, but it can't be opened after encryption. I don't know if the person who made the question deliberately made a person's mentality

Another compressed package, sea There is a prompt in the comment information of zip
Seeing through here actually implies that the password is 123456 after the test

The solution is as follows:

4266gj2zn17b2jo5b62k73g22xg6j658350r5771vd40h4bd2ns33q30651y57s6752su3q05881hs3h53nb3603co2mv40l58n3da3f61i5

Direct hexadecimal to character, found that the solution is garbled. In fact, this is a double hex code. I haven't encountered it before, but there is a hint in the title. The file of memory forensics analysis just now shows that it is twin Online website Solution

Vnw3HC07BDgbBWNRGTx2fSckf399V1Z9CxIvHVd6fHsaEnR8fX40NyQ7JhM8CWV5fgMNN24=

The last step is to write the decryption script. Here we directly use taoshen mumuzi's taoshen blog: https://blog.csdn.net/qq_42880719

import base64
import random
secret = "Vnw3HC07BDgbBWNRGTx2fSckf399V1Z9CxIvHVd6fHsaEnR8fX40NyQ7JhM8CWV5fgMNN24="
dec = base64.b64decode(secret).decode("utf-8")
# for i in range(len(dec)):
# 	print(ord(dec[i]))
def r(s, num): #Caesar
	l=""
	for i in s:
		if(ord(i) in range(97,97+26)):
			l+=chr((ord(i)-97+num)%26+97)
		else:
			l+=i
	return l

for i in range(86,128):
	j = 1
	tmp = [""]*len(dec)
	tmp[-1] = chr(i)#Restore the last bit of blasting to restore all
	while j != len(dec):
		tmp[-j-1] = chr(ord(dec[-j])^ord(tmp[-j])) #Reverse XOR
		j += 1
	s = tmp[-1] #Because the last one is the last and the first XOR, the first XOR is actually the last one
	for i in range(len(tmp)-1):
		s += tmp[i]#Here is to splice the second to the last bit and add it after the first bit
	try:
		s = base64.b64decode(s).decode("utf-8")
		for i in range(1,26):#Traverse Caesar
			flag = r(s,i)
			print(flag)
	except:
		pass

Suspect x's hard drive

I'm too delicious. I haven't reproduced the wp according to the bosses. I won't write it first

Keywords: MISC

Added by super_man on Fri, 18 Feb 2022 08:30:39 +0200